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Towards a Better Assessment of Pain and Suffering
Damages
by
Vaia Karapanou and Louis Visscher*
Abstract: Even though there is general consensus that pain and suffering damages for personal
injuries should primarily be based on the severity and duration of the impairment to health,
the amounts granted differ greatly between and within countries. There is no legal
framework to assess the correctness of the damages because a yardstick is lacking. The authors
argue that the concept of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) from the field of health
economics is able to provide the required framework. The primary legal objective of damages
is to restore the victim as closely as possible to the position he would have been in without the
accident. Besides compensation, satisfaction and prevention are also regularly mentioned as
goals of pain and suffering damages. Whatever the goal, the authors’ view is that pain and
suffering damages must be based on the impact of the health impairment on the victim. The
concept of QALYs allows pain and suffering damages to be based on the impact of the health
impairment. A QALY expresses the value of living one year in a certain health condition. The
health economics literature allows an assessment of the impact of different health conditions
on quality of life. By subsequently monetizing QALYs, this impact is expressed in monetary
terms, which provides a systematic basis for pain and suffering damages. The authors compare
pain and suffering damages in several European countries with the amounts that would result
from a conservative estimate of the monetary value of a QALY for specific types of personal
injuries. They show that the amounts that are currently awarded are too low when compared
to this assessment of the impact of the injury on quality of life.
(2010) 1 JETL 48
I. Introduction
In this paper we investigate the size of pain and suffering damages for personal
physical injuries. We limit ourselves to physical injuries occurring in a system
of tort law.1 The difficulty faced by courts in assessing pain and suffering
damages lies in the non-pecuniary nature of the losses. They may include pain,
suffering, anxiety, fear, emotional strain, physical and psychological reduction
of health and loss of enjoyment of life and these effects may occur for a limited
* Vaia Karapanou is a PhD student in the European Doctorate in Law and Economics
(EDLE) and is attached to the Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE) of the
Erasmus School of Law; Louis Visscher is Associate Professor in Law and Economics at
RILE.
1 We exclude fatal accidents from our analysis, because this requires different economic
concepts (the so-called value of a statistical life and value of a statistical life year) than that
applied in this paper.
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period of time or persist indefinitely. All these negative effects lead to a
diminution of what could generally be described as quality of life.
The term ‘pain and suffering damages’ is often used by legal systems to denote
the damages awarded to compensate for the pain, fear, anxiety, suffering,
anguish and emotional distress experienced with a physical injury. Some legal
systems also compensate for the loss of enjoyment of life as such, which is
frequently termed as ‘loss of amenity’. However, the most important aspect of
a personal injury, namely the impact of the injury to the health condition itself,
is usually neglected and not assessed at all. Yet it is this diminution in health
that primarily affects the quality of life of an individual, which should be the
basic element in evaluating injury-related losses. In this paper we do not use
the term ‘pain and suffering damages’ in a strictly legal or literal sense. By ‘pain
and suffering damages’ we denote all damages awarded to compensate for non-
pecuniary losses resulting from an injury. We focus specifically on the
diminution in the quality of life following from the injury and propose the use
of insights from the field of health economics to allow an assessment of the
negative effects visited upon the health condition of the injured individual.
The concept of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) from the domain of
health economics addresses the impact of diverging health impairments on
quality of life and is able to convey both the severity and the duration of a
health impairment. In our opinion, it can offer a systematic external
framework which allows a better assessment of pain and suffering damages
in personal injuries than the current legal approach. This way, such damages
can be founded on their true basis, that is, the impact of the personal injury on
the quality of life of the victim.2
2 It is beyond the scope of our paper to address the issues related to using a regulatory
measure like QALYs for the assessment of pain and suffering damages. We refer the
interested reader to the following publications. CR Sunstein/E Posner, Dollars and Death
(2005) 72 University of Chicago Law Review (UChi LRev) 537 discuss the possibility of
using the value of statistical life, which is also developed in the area of regulation, for
awarding damages in tort law. TR Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the
System Survive? (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law Review (NwU LRev) 876
analyses methods for valuating life, health and safety which were originally developed for
use in regulatory analysis, but which have found their way into tort litigation as well. TR
Miller, Valuing Nonfatal Quality of Life Losses with Quality-Adjusted Life Years: The
Health Economist’s Meow (2000) 13 Journal of Forensic Economics (JFE) 145 has also
suggested to use QALYs as a technique that forensic experts can apply to help guide jury
valuations on quality of life losses. Miller describes several existing QALY scales and
argues that per case, depending on the injuries of the victim, different scales might be
applied. Then, experts, by using the selected scale, have to evaluate the plaintiff’s func-
tional and psychological loss (by polling the plaintiff and possibly his caregivers and by
examining existing surveys or even by surveying people similar to the victim) and sub-
sequently convert it into QALY loss. Our paper differs from Miller’s approach in the
sense that we propose to use the general QALY weights as they can be found in health
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Our paper is structured as follows. In Section II we address the goals attributed
to pain and suffering damages. According to the literature, the severity and
duration of the health impairment forms the starting point for assessing pain
and suffering damages. This holds not only for the legal literature that focuses
on the goals of compensation and satisfaction, but also for the law and
economics literature that highlights the goal of deterrence. In Section III we
briefly describe the ways in which different European countries deal with pain
and suffering damages. In Section IV we discuss the concept of QALYs, which
expresses the gravity of different health conditions. This concept in our view
provides important information regarding pain and suffering damages,
precisely because it has regard to the severity and duration of health
impairments. In Section V we will compare the magnitude of pain and
suffering damages in concrete cases in different European countries with our
theoretical findings. We will not reach an exact determination of the ‘correct
magnitude’ of pain and suffering damages, because the existing research does
not allow such a conclusion. What does become clear, however, is that the
amounts that are awarded are generally too low. In Section VI, we give our
conclusions.
II. The goals of pain and suffering damages
A. Compensation and satisfaction as main goals
If one reads the legal literature regarding the goals and functions of pain and
suffering damages, it quickly becomes clear that two possible goals are
especially emphasised, even though in practice they might not always be
distinguishable: compensation and satisfaction.3 First and foremost, damages
for non-pecuniary losses aim at compensating the victim.4 In this respect, they
economics literature, without estimating them in each and every individual case. The
costs of doing so in our view would be very high. We also use a much lower monetary
value for a QALY than Miller does, to reduce the risk of overestimating non-pecuniary
losses. In our view, QALYs offer a good starting point in the assessment of pain and
suffering damages, because they focus on the duration and intensity of the health im-
pairment. However, courts should have the possibility to also include other relevant
factors into the final assessment. Our paper leaves more room for this than Miller’s more
detailed approach does. Finally, we provide a comparison of the QALY-based approach
with the outcome of concrete cases in several European countries.
3 See eg C van Dam, European Tort Law (2006) 301– 303. It is noteworthy that King, in a
paper which explicitly analyses the relationship between pain and suffering damages and
the goals of tort law in general, argues for the abolition of pain and suffering damages
because they are in his view incompatible with these goals. See JH King Jr, Pain and
Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law (2004) 57 Southern Me-
thodist University Law Review (SMU LRev) 201.
4 See eg VE Schwartz, Pain and Suffering Damages: What Are They and Can They Be
Measured? in: L Kramer (ed), Reforming the Civil Justice System (1996) 425.
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serve the same goal as damages for pecuniary losses. Broadly stated, the idea is
that the damages provide something positive to the victim which, as far as
possible, offers some counterweight against the losses he has suffered.
Comparative analysis of damages for non-pecuniary loss clearly shows that
compensation is regarded as an important goal of pain and suffering damages
in all countries.5
A second goal that is often distinguished is ‘satisfaction’, ie making up for or
recognising the injustice that was done, or satisfying the victim’s feelings of
grievance or outrage. The term is sometimes directed more towards the injurer
than the victim, and then it aims at ‘letting the injurer pay’.6
It is not in every legal system that satisfaction is regarded as a separate goal
from compensation. In Austria, Belgium, Poland and Spain compensation is
regarded as the sole goal.7 Regarding English law, it is doubted if satisfaction is
relevant.8 In France, punishment was historically regarded as a goal, but since
fault liability has increasingly been replaced by strict liability, this view no
longer holds. Compensation of objective losses is a better explanation.
Subjective perceptions are not relevant, because that cannot explain why
comatose victims also receive compensation.9
In other countries, satisfaction is recognised as a separate goal. In Italy,
compensation is recognised as the primary goal of the main head of pain and
suffering damages in personal injury cases while satisfaction is a secondary
function.10 In Dutch and Greek law, compensation and satisfaction may be
regarded as the two most important functions.11 Regarding the Netherlands,
recent literature shows that satisfaction is currently interpreted more as
acknowledgment of sorrow. This is also how the Dutch Supreme Court has
expressed it.12 The Dutch legislation is based on the German, which takes
compensation (Ausgleich) and satisfaction (Genugtuung) as the main func-
5 WVH Rogers (ed), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective
(2001).
6 See eg SD Lindenbergh, Smartengeld (Pain and Suffering Damages) (1998) 60.
7 E Karner/H Koziol, Austria, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 26 ff; H Cousy/D Droshout, Belgium,
in: Rogers (fn 5) no 19 f; M Nesterowicz/E Bagin´ska, Poland, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 2,
16 ff; M Martín-Casals/J Ribot/J Solé, Spain, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 1, 18 ff.
8 WVH Rogers, England, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 17.
9 S Galand-Carval, France, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 30 ff.
10 FD Busnelli/G Comandé, Italy, in: BA Koch/H Koziol (eds), Compensation for Per-
sonal Injury in a Comparative Perspective (2003) no 10 ff.
11 MH Wissink/WH van Boom, The Netherlands, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 18 ff; KD Kerameus,
Greece, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 6 ff.
12 R-J Tjittes, Smartengeld voor bewustelozen (Pain and Suffering Damages for the Un-
conscious) [2003] Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht (NTBR) 50.
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tions of pain and suffering damages.13 Compensation is the most important
function, but satisfaction enables the incorporation of other factors in the
determination of damages, such as the injurer’s degree of fault. However, this
only plays a minor role as compared to compensation objectives.14 Sometimes
a third function is added in cases of severe injuries which lead to the total
destruction of the victim’s personality. In such cases, where compensation and
satisfaction are not possible anymore, pain and suffering damages serve to
express the importance German law attaches to human dignity.15
Lindenbergh argues that, in the Netherlands, satisfaction has no separate
meaning besides compensation because factors such as the behaviour of the
injurer can also be captured under the compensation analysis.16 Tjittes reaches
the same conclusion if ‘acknowledgment of sorrow’ is used in a subjective way.
However, if it is used in an objective way, so that it is irrelevant if the victim
was aware of any suffering, it can lead to the award of pain and suffering
damages where the mere compensation goal could not. After all, if someone is
not aware that he has suffered, there is nothing to compensate. Tjittes regrets
that the Dutch Supreme Court on this point did not provide the same level of
clarity as the German and French Supreme Courts, which accept human
dignity and the personal integrity of the victim as reasons for awarding pain
and suffering damages in cases where the victim was unconscious or
comatose.17
In conclusion, compensation is generally regarded as a main goal of pain and
suffering damages. Some countries regard satisfaction as a separate goal
whereas others do not. In any case, the starting point for the assessment of pain
and suffering damages always lies in the severity of the losses. Issues such as the
degree of fault may have an impact, but this will be limited. Hence, for the
assessment of damages, the nature, duration and intensity of the pain, the
seriousness of the injury, the extent of the physical and psychological
diminution in health, the loss of enjoyment of life, etc are of paramount
13 BS Markesinis/H Unberath, The German Law of Torts. A Comparative Treatise (4th
edn 2002) 916 ff.
14 Lindenbergh (fn 6) 16, 18, 33. Also see eg J Luckey, Schmerzensgeld in Deutschland –
Tendenzen der Rechtsprechung, in: AG Rechtsanwälte im Medizinrecht eV (ed),
Arzthaftungsrecht – Rechtspraxis und Perspektiven (2006) 51 ff.
15 U Magnus/J Fedtke, Germany, in: Rogers (fn 5) no 9.
16 Lindenbergh (fn 6) 45. SD Lindenbergh, Smartengeld. Tien jaar later (Pain and Suffering
Damages. Ten years later) (2008) 6 states that compensation also plays the central role in
Germany and England.
17 Tjittes [2003] NTBR 51. Also see T Hartlief, Affectieschade: vergoeden of erkennen?
De rol van het vermogensrecht bij het verwerken van leed van naasten (Loss of Affection:
Compensate or Recognize? The Role of Patrimonial Law in Coping with the Suffering of
Loved Ones), in: GE van Maanen (ed), De rol van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht bij de
verwerking van persoonlijk leed (The Role of Tort Law in Coping with Personal Losses)
(2003) 136.
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importance. Several authors argue that one should in principle strive for full
compensation, however difficult.18 The fact that pain and suffering damages
are often restricted is not because immaterial interests are of inferior quality,
but because it is difficult to assess them in monetary terms.19
B. Prevention as goal?
The legal literature on the goals of tort law in general, and pain and suffering
damages in particular, sometimes refers to prevention as a separate goal.20
The law and economics literature, which in the USA is incorporated into the
legal literature generally, focuses on precisely this preventive goal. The basic
idea is that the prospect of being held liable if one causes losses provides one
with incentives to take care and/or to reduce one’s activity level. In this
literature, there is extensive discussion of the issue whether pain and suffering
should be included in the damages. The so-called prevention theory argues
that injurers should pay pain and suffering damages in order to receive the
correct behavioural incentives. The so-called insurance theory, however,
argues that the victim should not receive compensation for such losses, because
rational actors would not take out insurance against them. We believe a
synthesis of both theories can be achieved if one realises that rational people
are willing to spend resources in trying to avoid accidents which might cause
immaterial losses. These resources in our view form the correct basis for
damages, under both the prevention theory and the insurance theory.21
We let this debate rest here, because it is not decisive for our paper.22 What is
important is that if one accepts prevention as a separate goal of pain and
18 See eg Lindenbergh (fn 6) 60 and G Müller, Zum Ausgleich des immateriellen Schadens
nach § 847 BGB [1993] Versicherungsrecht (VersR) 911 who strongly emphasises the
difficulties in measuring immaterial losses.
19 Lindenbergh (fn 6) 60; Müller [1993] VersR 911; Karner/Koziol (fn 7) no 3.
20 See eg KS Abraham, The forms and functions of Tort Law (2nd edn 2002) 15 f; W van
Gerven/J Lever/P Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and
International Tort Law (2000) 25 ff; Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th edn
1984) 25; H Kötz, Deliktsrecht (9th rev edn 2001) 18 ff.
21 RR Bovbjerg/FA Sloan/JF Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling ‘Pain
and Suffering’ (1989) 83 NwU LRev 913 fn 31; M Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and
Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary
Injuries (1995) 83 California Law Review (Cal LRev) 779; H-B Schäfer/C Ott, Lehr-
buch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts (4th rev edn 2005) 371.
22 We refer the interested reader to eg Bovbjerg/Sloan/Blumstein (1989) 83 NwU LRev
913; C Ott/H-B Schäfer, Schmerzensgeld bei Körperverletzungen. Eine ökonomische
Analyse [1990] Juristenzeitung (JZ) 568; E Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Ef-
ficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compen-
sation (1993) 79 Virginia Law Review (Va LRev) 110 ff; SP Croley/JD Hanson, The
JETL 1/2010 Towards a Better Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages 53
Brought to you by | Universiteitsbibliotheek (Universiteitsbibliotheek)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 2/17/12 3:12 PM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
suffering damages, the magnitude of damages should again be based on the
severity and duration of the injuries. After all, the prevention goal entails that
the potential injurer should be confronted with the consequences of his
behaviour for others.23 The consequences of the accident for the victim,
besides his pecuniary losses, consist of the impact of the accident on his quality
of life. Hence, the basis of damages is again found in the extent and duration of
the health impairment.
C. Conclusion
Our conclusion of this Section can be brief. Compensation is generally
regarded as the main goal of pain and suffering damages. Satisfaction is
sometimes seen as an additional, separate goal, but often it is not. Regarding
prevention, European legal literature seldom mentions it as a separate goal, but
in the law and economics literature it is paramount.
It is not our aim to argue which of the possible goals is more important than the
others. What is important for our paper is that proponents of all the above-
discussed goals state that pain and suffering damages must primarily be based
on factors such as the nature, duration and intensity of the pain, the seriousness
of the injury, etc. Issues such as the behaviour of the injurer may subsequently
lead to slight corrections of the initially assessed amount.
Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law (1995) 108
Harvard Law Review (Harv LRev) 1845 ff, 1898, 1906 ff; M Geistfeld (1995) 83 Cal
LRev 779; J Arlen, Tort Damages, in: B Bouckaert/G de Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of
Law and Economics, Vol II Civil Law and Economics (2000) 702; MG Faure, Com-
pensation of Non-Pecuniary Loss: An Economic Perspective, in: U Magnus/J Spier
(eds), European Tort Law, Liber Amicorum for Helmut Koziol (2000) 143; S Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (2004) 242 and 269 ff; Schäfer/Ott (fn 21)
371; SD Lindenbergh/PPM van Kippersluis, Non Pecuniary Losses, in: M Faure (ed),
Tort Law and Economics, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol 1 (2009) 218 ff.
23 It should be noted that under a rule of negligence, damages do not necessarily have to
equal the losses of the victim. As long as expected liability outweighs the cost of optimal
care, the injurer will receive the correct care incentives. However, as long as it is clear for
the potential injurer what constitutes due care, basing the damages on the losses will not
lead to over-deterrence, because the potential injurer can escape liability by taking due
care. Hence, basing damages on losses can provide the correct care incentives under both
negligence and strict liability. Given that a claim for pain and suffering damages may be
based on negligence in the one accident setting and on strict liability in the other, in our
paper we do not further discuss this possible difference in damages between the two
rules. Besides, if the legal system requires a causal relationship between the negligence
and the losses, this differ ACHTUNGTRENNUNGence between negligence and strict liability disappears so that
damages should be based on the losses under negligence as well. See M Kahan, Causation
and the Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule (1989) 18 Journal of Legal
Studies (JLS) 427.
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In our view, the concept of QALYs provides a very good starting point for
assessing pain and suffering damages, because it has regard to the impact of the
injury (with the associated pain, residual impairments, scars, etc) on the quality
of life of the victim. Hence, it aims at precisely the immaterial aspects that pain
and suffering damages seek to address. We therefore argue in the remainder of
our paper that QALYs could be utilised as a way to yield better assessments of
pain and suffering damages. Of course, after the initial assessment of pain and
suffering damages on the basis of QALYs, subsequent corrections on the basis
of other factors that are deemed relevant in a particular jurisdiction, such as the
degree of fault of the wrongdoer, are still possible. The same holds for the
possibility of attaching significance to specific circumstances of the individual
case and the individual victim, which may justify further adjustment of the
objectively assessed QALY loss. The approach we propose does not concern
this phase of fine-tuning. QALYs are, after all, based on large-scale research
rather than on separate cases. Individual characteristics, for example the
circumstance that amputation of a finger may affect a musician more severely
than a lawyer, are not included in the QALY. Hence, QALYs are not relevant
in the stage of fine-tuning. We will argue, however, that they could be used for
a better first assessment of pain and suffering damages, which subsequently
may be corrected on the basis of other factors.
III. Assessment of pain and suffering damages in different countries
A. Introduction
To attain the aforementioned goals of compensation, satisfaction and
prevention, it is evident that court awards for pain and suffering damages
should correspond to the harm incurred. In personal injury cases especially,
this consequently entails that the assessment of pain and suffering damages
should involve not only the incorporation of all immaterial losses incurred in
the compensation award but also the calculation of the damages in the light of
criteria such as the duration and intensity of the pain, the severity of the injury,
the reduction in physical and psychological aspects of health, as well as the loss
of enjoyment of life and emotional strain normally associated with the specific
injury. Different countries recognise these criteria explicitly or implicitly as
determinants for the evaluation of pain and suffering damages. In some
countries this is also evident in the categorisation of personal injury case law in
tables according to the injury suffered.24 However, the ways these criteria are
employed to assess pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases, and the
size of the awards that they produce, differ within and between legal
24 See for instance S Hacks/A Ring/P Böhm, Schmerzensgeld-Beträge 2009 (26th edn 09/
2008).
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jurisdictions.25 The mere fact that the amounts differ between jurisdictions,
although often stressed in the literature, is not in itself problematic. After all,
differences in, for instance, Gross National Income Per Capita, the level of
social security, social norms, and the existence of public and/or private
insurance, all may impact on the assessment of the immaterial losses connected
with the injuries. Differences within a jurisdiction in our view are more
difficult to justify and may be caused by the lack of a coherent framework for
assessment.
B. Tables, tariffs and judicial discretion
Utilising tables and tariffs to assess pain and suffering damages facilitates the
standardisation of awards within a country and allows inter-country
comparisons. However, their use should be distinguished according to the
type of tables and tariffs used and the level of courts’ adherence to them in their
decision on pain and suffering damages.
In Germany and the Netherlands, systematised tables exist which record the
material facts and amounts awarded in previously adjudicated personal injury
cases. In Germany, the so-called Schmerzensgeldtabellen are tables of pain and
suffering damages awarded in previous cases which assist courts in determin-
ing damages in the case at hand. Even though judges are expected to consult
these tables and award an amount comparable to what was previously awarded
for a similar injury, they still enjoy a wide discretion and may decide to award
amounts of different magnitude provided they give adequate reasons to justify
their decision.26 A certain amount of discretion is also enjoyed by courts in the
Netherlands. An overview of cases published by the journal Verkeersrecht
with damages awarded for pain and suffering in previous cases serves as a
guideline, while courts may also take into consideration amounts awarded in
other countries.27 The resulting awards of pain and suffering damages are
considered to be quite modest compared to other legal systems.
Italy is an interesting case as the tables used for the evaluation of pain and
suffering damages in personal injury cases do not consist of previously decided
cases and the amounts there awarded but of amounts corresponding to so-
25 For extensive overviews, see Rogers (fn 5); Koch/Koziol (fn 10); G Comandé, Towards a
Global Model for Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging Europe and the
United States (2005) 19 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal (Temp Int’l
& Comp LJ) 247.
26 B Markesinis/M Coester/G Alpa/A Ullstein, Compensation for Personal Injury in
English, German and Italian Law. A Comparative Outline (2005) 59– 82; Markesinis/
Unberath (fn 13) 919– 923.
27 Wissink/van Boom (fn 11) no 43 ff; WH van Boom, The Netherlands, in: Koch/Koziol
(fn 10) no 66 ff; SD Lindenbergh/R Verburg, The Netherlands, in: M Bona/P Mead
(eds), Personal Injury Compensation in Europe (2003) 373.
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called invalidity points. In Italy, immaterial losses in personal injury cases are
divided in temporary and permanent damage to health (danno alla salute or
danno biologico) and damages for moral suffering (danno morale). Damages to
health are the most important and are always awarded in personal injury cases.
Their calculation is facilitated by the use of tables drafted with the help of
medical experts which indicate damages for each accruing invalidity point.28
Every court possesses its own table which may result in systematically
diverging amounts of compensation in different Italian jurisdictions. For this
reason the legislator has intervened with a law that fixes uniform damages
tables for the first nine percentage points of invalidity, leaving damages for
more serious cases to be determined by the courts.29 The calculation of
damages for moral suffering is left to the discretion of the court, although in
practice the amount awarded is roughly half the amount of damages to
health.30
In Belgium, experts evaluate the injury suffered by assigning to it a percentage
of invalidity. This percentage is thought to reflect the degree of inability to
work.31 Unlike Italy, where damage to health as such automatically results in
compensation, personal injury is compensated in Belgium on the basis of its
relation to the degree of the victim’s inability to work following the injury. A
table known as the Indicatieve tabel van forfaitaire schadevergoedingen bij
verkeersongevallen contains compensation amounts per invalidity percentage
for personal injuries as well as compensation amounts for other kinds of
losses.32 The amounts specified in the table are only a guideline for the courts.
In England, the relative magnitude of pain and suffering damages for different
personal injuries is set by judges and moderated by the Court of Appeal.33 The
most severe personal injury is awarded an amount of pain and suffering
damages which is considered as the point of reference for all other injuries.34
Scaling down from that amount, tariffs for other injuries are created. These
tariffs do not provide concrete amounts but usually allow for a range for the
same category of injuries, leaving it to the discretion of the judge to grant an
amount within this range that varies according to the circumstances of the case.
28 Markesinis/Coester/Alpa/Ullstein (fn 26) 82– 96, FD Busnelli/G Comandé, Italy, in:
Rogers (fn 5) no 1 ff.
29 See <www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=3970> for the currently set amounts of
dam ACHTUNGTRENNUNGages to health up to 9 % points of invalidity as updated by Decree of the Ministry of
Economic Development of 9 June 2009.
30 See supra fn 25.
31 Cousy/Droshout (fn 7) no 11 ff.
32 H Cousy/D Droshout, Belgium, in: Koch/Koziol (fn 10) no 71 ff.
33 Markesinis/Coester/Alpa/Ullstein (fn 26) 46– 51; Van Dam (fn 3) 323.
34 WVH Rogers, England, in: U Magnus (ed), Unification of Tort Law: Damages (2001) no
26 ff.
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Pain and suffering damages awarded in England are higher than those awarded
in most EU countries.
In Austria judicial tariffs assign a monetary value to the pain and suffering
experienced daily. The values differ depending on whether the pain was mild,
medium, intense or extreme.35 These tariffs are frequently used by courts in the
calculation of pain and suffering damages, although they are of limited
importance for more serious and lasting injuries.36
Wide judicial discretion is characteristic of the assessment of pain and suffering
damages in personal injury cases in Greece. Although the judge is expected to
take past rulings into consideration, the lack of systematised tables or tariffs in
practice results in decisions based only on the merits of the case. The resulting
awards are rather low.37
C. In need of an alternative assessment method?
In all these legal systems, the intensity of the pain, the type, severity and
duration of the injury, the reduction in health, etc are supposed to play a major
role in the calculation of pain and suffering damages. However, pain and
suffering damages for similar or even the same injuries differ greatly not only
between but also within countries. The latter consideration in particular
suggests that pain and suffering damages awarded may not be calculated
correctly in accordance with the severity and duration of the health
impairment. Courts seem to lack a measure against which the correctness of
the awards can be evaluated. In Germany and the Netherlands, the use of tables
with previously adjudicated amounts to facilitate the assessment of pain and
suffering damages does not necessarily result in amounts based on the extent of
the injury. After all, reliance on past rulings does not necessarily mean that
these rulings were correct to start with. In England, the existing tariffs are
based on the courts’ perception of the injuries and there is no reason why pain
and suffering damages for the gravest injury, used as the reference point for all
other awards, should be assessed at current levels instead of an order of
magnitude higher or lower. In Italy, where specialised invalidity tables exist,
the problem remains that pain and suffering damages for the same serious
injuries may differ systematically within the country’s jurisdictions. In
Belgium and Austria, where the tables and tariffs are at most a recommen-
dation to the courts, the problem again arises how pain and suffering damages
are to be evaluated. In Greece, total judicial discretion creates reasonable
35 I Greiter, Austria, in: Bona/Mead (fn 27) 31.
36 BA Koch/H Koziol, Österreich, in: Koch/Koziol (fn 10) no 60 ff; Karner/Koziol (fn 7)
no 20 ff. Indicative tariffs may be found in Judicial Studies Board, Guidelines for the
Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (9th edn 2008).
37 Kerameus (fn 11) no 7.
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doubt about the criteria used to evaluate losses and the resulting magnitude of
pain and suffering damages.
Different methodologies employed in the assessment of damages, resulting in
highly divergent amounts, suggest that the existing legal frameworks are
inadequate to effect the proper assessment of pain and suffering damages. In
the remainder of our paper we will argue that the concept of Quality Adjusted
Life Years offers a good reference point on the basis of which to reach relative
rankings of different health conditions resulting from accidents.
IV. Quality Adjusted Life Years
A. What are QALYs?
A QALY is a measure of the value of living one year in a certain health
condition. The health condition is used as a proxy for quality of life during the
year. QALYs are often used in evaluating different health programmes,
medical treatments and techniques.38
In order to be able to calculate QALYs, different health conditions have to be
established, ranging from perfect health to death and including everything in
between. Each condition is assigned a QALY weight, varying from 0.00
(death) to 1.00 (perfect health). Conditions which are regarded as even worse
than death are assigned a negative value. QALYs are calculated as the sum of
the health conditions of the individual during the time those conditions last.
By applying QALYs, one can form an opinion on the relative value of different
treatment possibilities. Suppose for example that, for a person with a certain
ailment two treatments exist which are equally expensive. Treatment A
increases the quality of life by 0.1 for 5 years, treatment B by 0.2 for 3 years.
According to the QALY method, treatment B is preferred, because it yields 0.6
QALY (0.2 X 3) while treatment A ‘only’ yields 0.5 QALY for the same
amount of money.39
38 See eg J Brazier et al, A review of the use of health status measures in economic eval-
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGuation (1999) 3 Health Technology Assessment (HTA) 3, 4; P Dolan, The measurement
of health related quality of life for use in resource allocation decisions in health care, in:
AJ Culyer/JP Newhouse (eds), Handbook of Health Economics, vol 1B (2000); S
Folland/AC Goodman/M Stano, The Economics of Health and Health Care (5th edn
2007) 81.
39 This comparison does not yet show whether treatment A and/or B are worth their costs.
For this, one has to evaluate how much a QALY is worth in money terms. See further
Section IV.B. below.
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Different methods exist for trying to establish QALY weights.40 In some
methods, respondents are asked to compare two situations in order to elicit
their overall perception of a specific ailment. In the ‘standard gamble’ method,
for example, people are asked to choose between living in a certain health
condition on the one hand, and on the other hand, undergoing treatment
which, with varying probability, leads to either perfect health or death. The
lowest probability of perfect health which the respondents still assess as high
enough to undergo the treatment determines the QALY weight of the ailment.
If, for instance, I am indifferent between continuing to live with the ailment in
question or undergoing a treatment which has 70 % probability of restoring
me to perfect health and 30 % probability of leading to death, then the QALY
weight of the ailment is 0.7. Under another method, the ‘time trade-off’,
respondents are asked to trade off x years of perfect health with y years with a
certain health condition. The ratio x/y determines the QALY weight. Hence,
the more life-years the respondent is willing to forego in order to achieve
perfect health, the lower the QALY weight for the health condition involved.
So, if a respondent assesses 40 years life expectancy with the ailment as equal to
30 years in perfect health, the QALY factor is 0.75. In the ‘person trade-off’,
respondents are asked to make a trade-off between people in one health
condition and people in another. Respondents are, for example, asked to
choose between improving the health or extending the life expectancy of x
people in the first (better) condition and improving the health or extending the
life expectancy of y people in the second (worse) condition.41 The ratio x/y
determines the relative QALY weights of both conditions. If respondents are,
for example, indifferent between extending life by one year for 20 healthy
people and extending life by the same amount for 25 people with a certain
health condition, then the QALY weight of the second health condition is 20/
25 = 0.8.
In another method, the ‘visual analogue scale’, respondents are asked to rank
the ailment on a vertical line with concrete endpoints ranging from 0 to 100
where 0 represents death and 100 represents perfect health. To account for
ailments that may be perceived as worse than death, the endpoints of the scale
may be modified so that 0 represents the worst imaginable health condition
40 See eg E Nord, Methods for quality adjustment of life years (1992) 34 Social Science and
Medicine (Soc Sci Med) 561 ff; M Johannesson/B Jönsson/G Karlsson, Outcome Mea-
surement in Economic Evaluation (1996) 5 Health Economics (Health Econ) 283 f; H
Bleichrodt/M Johannesson, Standard gamble, time trade-off and rating scale: experi-
mental results on the ranking properties of QALYs (1997) 16 Journal of Health Eco-
nomics (J Health Econ) 155 – 157; Brazier et al (1999) 3 HTA 23 ff; Dolan (fn 38)
1733 ff; US EPA, Office of Research and Development, Human Health Metrics for
Environmental Decision Support Tools: Lessons from Health Economics and Decision
Analysis (Sept 2001) 16, 17; JK Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP (2002) 22 Risk Analysis
994 – 996 for a more extensive treatment.
41 JK Hammitt (2002) 22 Risk Analysis 995. See also US EPA (fn 40) 17.
Vaia Karapanou and Louis Visscher JETL 1/201060
Brought to you by | Universiteitsbibliotheek (Universiteitsbibliotheek)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 2/17/12 3:12 PM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
and 100 represents the best imaginable health condition. For example, an
ailment rated with 85 points on the scale has a QALY factor of 0.85.
Other ways used to establish QALY weights are frequently referred to as
‘generic’ or ‘quality of life’ measures as they measure general attributes of
health conditions without emphasising a particular ailment. One of these
measures, the EuroQoL EQ-5D42 questionnaire, differentiates health states
using five dimensions: mobility, self care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and
anxiety/depression. In the first part of the questionnaire, respondents are
asked to mark their health condition on the basis of these five dimensions by
indicating whether they have no problems, moderate problems or extreme
problems in each. Each of these levels is assigned a weight previously elicited
by the visual analogue scale or the time trade-off method. In the second part of
the questionnaire, respondents are asked to rank their health condition on a
visual analogue scale, thus communicating their overall perception of the
ailment. The possible combinations of dimensions and their levels yield in total
243 different health states to which death and unconsciousness are added. The
QALY weight for a given health state is calculated from the respondent’s
overall evaluation of all health dimensions by adding together the relevant
weights and subtracting them from 1.00, ie perfect health.
Another generic measure, the ‘Health Utilities Index Mark 3’ (HUI3),43 uses
eight dimensions to classify health states: vision, hearing, speech, ambulation,
dexterity, emotion, cognition and pain. Each dimension comprises five or six
different levels (speech, emotion and pain have five levels) indicative of a
gradual deterioration in that dimension. These levels are assigned a weight
previously elicited by standard gamble and visual analogue scale methods.
Combining all possible dimensions and levels, 972,000 health states can be
realised in total. Respondents are asked to indicate how much a certain
condition affects the various health dimensions. The QALY weight of the
health state reflects the respondent’s overall evaluation of all health
dimensions.
Other generic measures to elicit QALY weights are the ‘Quality of Well-Being
Scale’, the ‘SF-6D’, the ‘15D’ and the ‘Rosser disability/distress scale’.
However, so far the EQ-5D and the HUI3 are regarded as better measures for
the QALY weight elicitation.44
42 See <www.euroqol.org> and especially K Cheung/M Oemar/M Oppe/R Rabin, EQ-
5D User Guide Basic information on how to use EQ-5D, 2009 <www.euroqol.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/Documenten/PDF/User_Guide_v2_March_2009.pdf >.
43 See <www.fhs.mcmaster.ca/hug/hui3.htm>. See also J Horsman/W Furlong/D Feeny/
G Torrance, The Health Utilities Index (HUI
®
): concepts, measurement properties and
applications (2003) 1 Health and Quality of Life Outcomes (HQLO)<www.hqlo.com/
content/1/1/54>. HUI3 is the most recently developed Health Utilities Index. Previous
versions are HUI, HUI1 and HUI2.
44 See Brazier et al (1999) 3 HTA 76.
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The different methods lead to different results, due amongst other things to the
type of questions being asked and the comparison being made (with death,
perfect health or another health condition). The standard gamble, the time
trade-off and the person trade-off are methods that require respondents to
compare two different situations on the basis of health (un)certainty, the
duration of different health conditions and the health of other people
respectively, whereas the visual analogue scale asks for an overall evaluation of
a particular health state by drawing a mark on a line, tasks which may be
difficult for respondents to understand and perform. On the other hand, the
generic measures in the form of a questionnaire are easier to understand but,
since they classify health states on the basis of specified dimensions, there may
be other affected aspects of health conditions that they are unable to evaluate.
Furthermore it is relevant whether the questions are asked to people who
actually have the health condition or not, or to doctors or other health
specialists. Depending on who answers the questions, the results may again be
different. If people with the condition are judged as more competent for the
elicitation of QALY weights, the question then becomes when to ask them.
People can adapt themselves to their life circumstances and thus an evaluation
of health condition made when this is first incurred may be different from an
evaluation at a later time.45 Hence, much research is still needed and a
refinement of the methods employed is necessary in order to acquire more
uniform QALY weights for the range of different health conditions.
B. Pain and suffering damages based on QALYs
Notwithstanding the abovementioned problems, we think that the insights
that have been acquired in health economics are of great value for the topic of
pain and suffering damages. Obviously the results have to be handled with care
due to the problems discussed above. However, in our view, even with the
limitations that still exist, it is better to base damages awards for deteriorations
in health on the results of this specialised research than on the amounts that
courts have awarded in the past. After all, there is no reason to assume in
advance that these judgments approximate the amounts which would do
justice to the gravity of the immaterial loss.
On the basis of the extensive health economics literature in which assessments
of QALY gains of different treatments and medical interventions are made,
educated assessments of the average QALY loss due to impairments in health
can be made. By subsequently attaching a money value to a QALY, pain and
suffering damages may be determined.46 This can be done by evaluating
45 Dolan (fn 38) 1738, 1739.
46 See eg M Johannesson/MC Weinstein, On the decision rules of cost-effectiveness ana-
lysis (1993) 12 J Health Econ 466; H Bleichrodt/J Quiggin, Life-cycle preferences over
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alternative treatments in terms of the QALYs they generate and the costs to be
implemented. By comparing the costs of the health treatments per QALY
gained, one arrives at a potential money value for one QALY. Another way is
to calculate the willingness to pay for a QALY increase. A recent overview of
literature which attaches a money value to a QALY47 indicates that authors
who have calculated the willingness to pay for a QALY reach a value of about
E 100,000 to E 150,000. Others look for the limits below or above which an
additional QALY is worth or not worth its costs, and arrive at an upper limit of
about E 184,000. The famous ‘kidney dialysis value’, which is based on the
consideration that kidney dialysis is regarded as a method which is (more than)
worth its costs, gives a lower limit of about E 79,500 to E 102,000 for one
QALY. In the UK, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) uses
a lower limit of about E 32,500 to E 48,500, which in most of the literature is
regarded as too low.48 In an international overview from 2000, an amount of
E 306,000 is given as the median value of the different estimates (28 of the 35
estimates exceed E 113,000).49
V. Magnitude of pain and suffering damages: legal and economic standards
compared
A. Legal and economic standards
As we have already mentioned above, several distinct factors are relevant in
determining the magnitude of pain and suffering damages, such as the nature,
duration and intensity of pain, grief and lost enjoyment of life, decreased life
expectancy, residual impairments, psychological problems, etc. The nature
consumption and health: when is cost-effectiveness analysis equivalent to cost-benefit
analysis? (1999) 18 J Health Econ 683 ff; P Dolan/R Edlin, Is it really possible to build a
bridge between cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis? (2002) 21 J Health
Econ 828; T Klose, A utility-theoretic model for QALYs and willingness to pay (2003)
12 Health Econ 17 ff. Also see the EuroVaQ project which aims at developing robust
methods to determine the monetary value of a QALY across a number of European
States: <http://research.ncl.ac.uk/eurovaq/index.html>.
47 D Kenkel, WTP- and QALY-Based Approaches to Valuing Health for Policy: Com-
mon Ground and Disputed Territory (2006) 34 Environmental & Resource Economics
(Environ Resource Econ) 421. All amounts in Section IV.B. are expressed in Euros from
2008.
48 M Pomp/W Brouwer/F Rutten, QALY-tijd. Nieuwe medische technologie, kosten-
effectiviteit en richtlijnen (QALY-ty. New Medical Technology, Cost-Effectiveness and
Guidelines) 37. <www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/cpbreeksen/document/152/doc152.pdf>. See
p 39 for other research that yields low values.
49 RA Hirth/ME Chernew/E Miller/M Fendrick/WG Weissert, Willingness to Pay for a
Quality-adjusted Life Year: In Search of a Standard (2000) 20 Medical Decision Making
(Med Decis Making) 338, 340.
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and extent of the injuries have an especially large influence on the final
quantification.50 Therefore QALYs, where the type of health impairment
determines the QALY weight, in our view provide a good basis on which to
determine pain and suffering damages. After all, the more serious the health
impairment, the lower the QALY level of the victim will be, and the longer the
health impairment lasts, the higher the total QALY loss suffered by the victim.
Furthermore, this measure exactly expresses the non-pecuniary losses because
it has regard to quality of life. Hence, the resulting awards are exclusive of any
additional pecuniary losses.
The size of pain and suffering damages differs between countries. In the
Netherlands, for example, the damages awarded are often lower than in other
European countries51 and the United States.52 The highest amount in the
Netherlands was about E 192,000, in Germany E 614,000, in Italy E 1,024,000,
and in England E 330,000, though in Sweden it was E 122,000 and in Denmark
E 88,500.53 As already mentioned, the mere fact that the amounts differ
between countries may not be a problem in itself and may be explained by
other factors. However, we doubt if such factors are also able to explain why
the differences are so large. The lack of a systematic framework for assessing
pain and suffering damages in our view may have contributed to these
differences. The question of the correct quantification of pain and suffering
damages cannot in any case be answered by merely comparing the amounts
granted in different countries, because that method lacks an external yardstick.
In order to answer the question, we therefore use the insights developed in
Section IV and compare those insights with a number of concrete cases from
different countries.54
In the current Section we provide information on the amounts of pain and
suffering damages that were granted for a number of specific injuries in several
European countries. Subsequently we compare these amounts with insights
from the field of health economics, where QALY weights for the selected
50 Lindenbergh (fn 6) 235 ff. The same shows from Rogers (fn 5), Comandé (2005) 19 Temp
Int’l & Comp LJ 260 ff and L Jaeger/J Luckey, Schmerzensgeld (4th edn 2008) 212 ff.
51 See SD Lindenbergh, Smartengeld: ontwikkeling en stilstand (Pain and Suffering
Dam ACHTUNGTRENNUNGages: Development and Stand-Still), in: M Jansen, Smartengeld (Pain and Suffering
Damages) (2006) 10.
52 A Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suffering Compar-
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGatively (2006) 55 DePaul Law Review (DePaul LRev) 392; SD Sugarman, A Compar-
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards (2006) 55 DePaul LRev 418.
53 For the Italian and German amounts, see Section V.B.1) below. The other amounts are
derived from Jansen (fn 51) 10. All amounts are expressed in Euros from 2005/2006.
54 Utilising the insights from health economics in our view solves the issue discussed by
Rogers (fn 5) 248 that ‘damages for non-pecuniary losses are certainly arbitrary in the
sense that it is difficult to find a logical basis on which damages for quadriplegia should
be E 300,000 rather than, say, E 30,000 or E 3,000,000’. For a similar argument, see
Comandé (2005) 19 Temp Int’l & Comp LJ 301 ff.
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medical conditions are assessed. The health economics research in this area is
extensive. We have chosen to use only publications which receive a quality
score of at least 4.5 on a scale ranging from 1.0 to 7.0 (indicating lowest and
highest quality respectively) as assessed by the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Registry (CEA) of the Center for the Evaluation of Value and Risk in Health in
Tufts Medical Center.55
It is important to note that, in the health economics literature, the passage of
time is relevant. Costs of medical treatment may be incurred today while the
benefits only occur in the future. Furthermore, the costs of medical treatment
may recur over a certain period. Because of this time aspect, costs and benefits
are discounted. Often the studies contain a sensitivity analysis using different
discount rates to evaluate the exact influence of the discount factor.56 As far as
we know, there is no common opinion on the ‘correct’ discount factor in
health economics research. In practice, a discount factor of about 3 –5% is
often applied.57 It is undisputed that the costs of medical treatment should be
discounted, because spending a sum of money comes at the opportunity cost of
investing it and receiving a return. There has been discussion, however,
whether benefits realised in the future should also be discounted, because they
do not relate to money which can be invested, but rather increases in quality of
life. However, in order to account for the time preference, benefits should also
be discounted, but not necessarily by the same factor as costs.58 The NICE in
previous guidelines applied a discount factor of 6 % for costs and 1.5 % for
health benefits. In a more recent version of the guidelines, both rates were set at
3.5 %. According to Brouwer et al. , this is wrong, because it does not allow for
the fact that the monetary value of health effects is expected to grow over time.
They therefore argue that the discount factor for health effects should be lower
than the discount factor for costs.59
Be this as it may, for the purposes of our paper, a different type of discounting
is necessary. We will use the insights from the health economics literature
regarding the impact of medical conditions on quality of life. This way, we
assess the non-pecuniary loss caused by personal injuries. By relating this to a
monetary value for a QALY, we derive a monetary expression of the non-
pecuniary loss. After having done so, we still have to account for the duration
of the medical condition. For example, if the monetary value of a certain injury
amounts to E 10,000 per year over a period of ten years, the damages should not
simply be assessed at E 100,000 but at the net present value of ten annual future
payments of E 10,000. The exact outcome depends on the discount factor
55 See <https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear/default.aspx>.
56 See eg DJ Torgerson/J Raftery, Discounting [1999] British Medical Journal (BMJ) 915.
57 WBF Brouwer et al, Need for differential discounting of costs and health effects in cost
effectiveness analyses [2005] BMJ 446.
58 Torgerson/Raftery [1999] BMJ 915.
59 Brouwer et al [2005] BMJ 447.
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applied. A discount factor of 4 % would result in a lump sum payment of
E 84,353 while a discount factor of 6 % would lead to E 78,017. In this paper,
we will apply a discount factor of 4 %, which is higher than the rate of 2.5 %
set in the United Kingdom60 and the 3.5 % suggested by NICE. Weir et al
argue that, for Canada, a discount factor of a maximum of 3 % should be
applied.61 In our view, choosing a discount factor of 4 % avoids the risk of
overestimating the monetary value of non-pecuniary losses due to inadequate
discounting.
B. Concrete cases
In this Section we will compare the amounts of pain and suffering damages
which were awarded in concrete cases for four types of losses, with the
amounts which result from applying the QALY approach. The selection of
countries is made on the basis of the availability of comparable cases. The
overview of amounts in different countries serves as an illustration of how the
QALY approach compares to the legal outcome in those countries.
1) Spinal cord lesion/paralysis
In cases of spinal cord lesion in the Netherlands, damages in the amount of
E 70,000 to E 124,000 are granted, depending on the position of the lesion,
residual pain, possible influence on fertility, incontinence, etc.62 In a Dutch
case from 1999, the Appellate Court granted E 90,756 in pain and suffering
damages to a 25-year-old victim who was paralysed in an accident due to a
spinal cord lesion. Expressed in 2006 values, this would be E 111,630.63 In
Germany, a 25-year-old man who suffered a spinal cord lesion in an accident
for which he was one-third comparatively negligent received E 150,000.64 In
another German case, the court awarded E 200,000 to a victim who was
paralysed from the neck down due to a spinal cord lesion. In other cases, even
higher amounts were awarded.65 The highest German award of pain and
suffering damages (E 614,000), as already mentioned, was in respect of a high
spinal cord lesion of a 3.5-year-old boy who cannot breathe on his own
anymore, suffers from residual pain and also sustained other injuries. In
Greece, E 250,000 was granted to a 23-year-old woman who suffered from
60 See Damages (Personal Injury) Order 2001, Statutory Instrument (SI) 2001/2301
<www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2001/20012301.htm>.
61 L Weir et al, The Discount Rate Revisited (Spring 2008) (13) Expert Witness newsletter
2008, <www.economica.ca/ew13_1p1.htm>.
62 Jansen (fn 51) 114 ff. The amounts are expressed in Euros from 2006.
63 Ibid, 116.
64 Jaeger/Luckey (fn 50) 1067.
65 Ibid, 1068 ff.
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quadriplegia due to a spinal cord lesion.66 In another Greek case, the court
awarded E 128,000 to a 25-year-old man who was found 40 % comparatively
negligent for the accident that resulted in his paralysis due to a spinal cord
lesion.67 In Italy the amount of E 1,024,128 was awarded to an 18-year-old
victim who was rendered paralysed due to a spinal cord lesion after a car
accident.68 The victim’s young age and the severity of the injury (85 %
paralysis) increased the damages award.
In a publication from 1999, a cost-effectiveness study regarding Computed
Tomography (CT) scans for trauma patients was published. Major trauma
patients arriving at a trauma centre are assumed to have unstable cervical spine
injuries, until proven differently. In order to establish if this type of injury
indeed exists, the standard procedure is a radiographic scan, which does not,
however, always show the injury. The more expensive CT scan provides better
information. The article investigates whether the better results of the CT scan
are worth the costs.69 The utility adjustments caused by spinal injury are
estimated with the use of the HUI2. The QALY weight of paralysis is assessed
at 0.516 (ranging from 0.465 to 0.611).70
Assuming non-perfect health before the paralysis, for example a QALY
weight of 0.9, the decrease due to the paralysis is 0.384 (0.9– 0.516). If we apply
a conservative monetary valuation of a QALY of E 50,000,71 which is lower
than the amounts proposed in the literature we discussed in Section IV.B., pain
and suffering damages can be calculated as follows. Every year, the paralysis
has lowered the quality of life of the victim by 0.384 QALY, which in
monetary terms equals E 19,200 (0.384 X E 50,000). Assuming an average life
expectancy of 78 years, a 25-year-old victim has 54 years of remaining life
expectancy. The pain and suffering damages hence are calculated as the net
present value of 54 payments of E 19,200, which amounts to E 439,000. This is
66 Kalamata Court of First Instance 107/2003, online in NOMOS: <http://lawdb.intra
softnet.com/index.php>.
67 Leukada Court of First Instance 472/2004, online in NOMOS: <http://lawdb.intra
softnet.com/index.php>.
68 Savona Court of First Instance, 29 July 2005, online in De Jure:<http://dejure.giuffre.
it/psixsite/PaginePubbliche/default.aspx>.
69 CC Blackmore et al, Cervical Spine Screening with CT in Trauma Patients: A Cost-
effectiveness Analysis [1999] Radiology 117.
70 Ibid, 121, 122. As to HUI2, see fn 43 above.
71 We have chosen to apply this low estimate of E 50,000 to reduce the risk of overes-
timating pain and suffering damages. As will become apparent in the remainder of the
paper, the calculated amounts are already (much) higher than the amounts currently
awarded in most countries. Given the possible problems in applying monetized QALY
values in tort law, which we discuss in the text above, we want to avoid the possible risk
of overestimated damages. By applying a very low estimate of E 50,000, our proposal to
substantially increase pain and suffering damages cannot be rejected by merely arguing
that we have chosen too high a money value for a QALY.
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substantially higher than the amounts generally awarded by the Dutch,
German and Greek courts.72 The highest German award is well in line with the
proposed approach, however, if one takes into consideration that the victim
there was even younger and that we use a low monetary value of E 50,000. The
Italian award in our view seems too high.
It is in principle possible to apply different monetary values to QALYs in
different countries, to account for divergences in the general standard of living
and other relevant factors. It goes beyond the scope of our paper to propose
such monetary values for QALYs per country. However, the EuroVaQ
project (see fn 46) will produce different monetary values for a number of
European countries, enabling this further fine-tuning.
2) Loss of an eye
Pain and suffering damages for the loss of an eye differ greatly between
countries. In the Netherlands awards are about E 22,000. Italy and Greece
make the highest awards (E 80,000 and E 88,000 respectively), Austria the
lowest (E 14,500).73 However, the awards differ greatly from case to case. For
example, in Germany a woman who suffered from inflammation of the
cerebral membrane due to her contact lenses and was blinded in one eye
received E 20,000 in pain and suffering damages.74 On the other hand, a 12-
year-old boy lost an eye in an accident in which he was found comparatively
negligent for one-third and he received E 125,000. The fact that he lost an eye at
such a young age, which forced him to be constantly careful in order to protect
his remaining eye, increased the award.75 In Greece, a 43-year-old mother of
two received about E 88,000 in pain and suffering damages for the complete
loss of vision in her left eye.76 In another case, E 80,000 was awarded to a 36-
year-old man who was injured in one eye by a flare and lost 80 % of his
vision77. However, a 46-year-old man whose left eye was destroyed after
someone kicked him in the face only received about E 29,000.78
72 If one also wants to incorporate a normal and expected worsening of health over time,
the QALY decrease in later years will be lower, resulting in a lower final amount.
73 For Italy and Austria, see Lindenbergh (fn 51) 10. For Greece, see the published court
decisions online in NOMOS: <http://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php>.
74 Jaeger/Luckey (fn 50) 411.
75 Ibid, 423.
76 Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Council of State) 2739/2007, online in NOMOS: <http://
lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php>.
77 Athens Administrative Court of First Instance 3441/2006, online in NOMOS:<http://
lawdb.intrasoftnet.com/index.php>.
78 Dodekanese Court of Appeal 307/2005, online in NOMOS: <http://lawdb.intra
softnet.com/index.php>.
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We did not find a QALY weight for the loss of an eye as such, but there is
relevant information to be found in other research. In a publication from 2003,
a cost-utility analysis of cataract surgery in the second eye after successful
treatment of the first eye is carried out.79 Earlier research already showed that
surgery to the first eye is very cost-effective.80 Furthermore, different research
suggests that the quality of life in patients with bilateral good vision is
substantially higher than that of patients with unilateral good vision.81 Hence,
this research provides information on the difference in QALY value between
sight with one eye and sight with two eyes. The total QALY gains of cataract
surgery to the second eye per patient are estimated at 1.31 QALY,82 which is
equivalent to E 65,500 if the conservative value of E 50,000 per QALY is used.
It is important to note that this cataract research involves older people, who
had a remaining life expectancy of 12 years. For younger victims with a longer
remaining life expectancy, the total QALY gains will be proportionally higher.
The already mentioned literature which compares quality of life between
unilateral and bilateral good vision suggests a difference of 0.109 QALY.
Hence, for a person with a remaining life expectancy of about 36 years (such as
the mother in the Greek case), the total QALY gains would amount to 3.9,
resulting in about E 107,000 in pain and suffering damages.83 Due to the
relatively low estimate of E 50,000 per QALY, the resulting amounts are still
comparatively low, but substantially higher than in most European countries,
apart from Italy and Greece. What is observable in the case law is that the age of
the victim does indeed seem to have an influence. In the German cases, the
young age of the victim was explicitly mentioned as a reason to increase the
level of damages. And in several Dutch cases, the court also refers to the youth
of the victim.84
79 BG Busbee et al, Cost-Utility Analysis of Cataract Surgery in the Second Eye [2003] 110
Ophthalmology 2310.
80 BG Busbee et al, Incremental Cost-effectiveness of Initial Cataract Surgery [2002] 109
Ophthalmology 609.
81 MM Brown et al, Quality of Life Associated with Unilateral and Bilateral Good Vision
(2001) 108 Ophthalmology 645. This research suggest a QALY difference of 0.08, while
subsequent research of the same authors (Busbee et al (2003) 110 Ophthalmology 2310)
results in a QALY difference of 0.109. We apply the more recent estimation in our
numerical example.
82 Busbee et al (2003) 110 Ophtalmology 2310, 2313.
83 The net present value of 36 payments of E 5,450 (0.109 X E 50,000), applying a discount
factor of 4 %, equals E 107,172.
84 Lindenbergh (fn 51) 76 ff.
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3) Deafness
The highest awards of pain and suffering damages for ear injuries in the
Netherlands are about E 42,543 and E 61,828 for severe deafness to both ears
suffered by a child aged 5 and by a baby as the result of medical treatment.85
There is extensive cost-utility research regarding cochlear implants, which are
hearing devices which are implanted in the inner ear, as opposed to the more
traditional acoustic hearing devices. In this research, it is investigated whether
cochlear implants increase quality of life enough to be worth their additional
cost. Summerfield et al investigated whether bilateral cochlear implants rather
than unilateral implants are cost-effective.86 The benefits of unilateral cochlear
implants include enhanced social and professional participation for adults and
increased integration in mainstream education for children. Cochlear implants
do not only benefit patients for whom acoustic hearing devices did not work
(the ‘traditional candidates’), but also improve the hearing of patients who
already benefited from acoustic hearing devices (the ‘marginal hearing aid
users’). Bilateral implants improve the ability to understand speech in noise
and to locate sources of sound. In the research, HUI2 was used to measure
utilities. The research found that the QALY loss as a result of profoundly
impaired hearing (and consequently, speech) is 0.281 for traditional candidates
and 0.145 for marginal hearing aid users.87
Again assuming a value of E 50,000 per QALY, deafness in both ears would
then be assessed at about E 14,000 per year for those who do not benefit from
acoustic devices, and E 7,250 for those who do. For the two Dutch cases, again
assuming a life expectancy of 78 years, this would result in amounts of about
E 345,000 if acoustic devices do not benefit the patient and E 178,000 if they
do.88
85 Jansen (fn 51) 81.
86 A Quentin Summerfield et al, A Cost-Utility Scenario Analysis of Bilateral Cochlear
Implantation [2002] Archives of Otolaryngology Head & Neck Surgery (Arch Oto-
laryngol Head Neck Surg) 1255.
87 Ibid, 1259. Research that focused on older patients found a mean increase in utility of
0.24. This overall increase is based on the HUI2 and consists of +0.15 (hearing), +0.11
(emotion), +0.02 (speech), -0.01 (ambulation), -0.01 (cognition) and -0.01 (pain). See
HW Francis et al, Impact of Cochlear Implants on the Functional Health Status of Older
Adults (2002) 112 The Laryngoscope 1484. Research that, conversely, focused on
children found increases in utility ranging from 0.22 to 0.39, depending on the method
used (time trade-off, visual analogue scale or HUI3). See AK Cheng et al, Cost-Utility
Analysis of the Cochlear Implant in Children [2000] The Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA) 855.
88 Please note that the UK Cochlear Implant Study Group, Criteria of Candidacy for
Unilateral Cochlear Implantation in Postlingually Deafened Adults II: Cost-Effective-
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGness Analysis (2004) 25 Ear and Hearing 342 applied a discount factor of 6 %, which
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4) Amputation of foot and lower extremities
It is difficult to assess pain and suffering damages for amputation of the foot or
lower extremities because in many cases the victim also suffers other injuries.
In the Netherlands,89 a 31-year-old motor driver was involved in a traffic
accident which resulted in the amputation of his lower leg. He received almost
E 56,000 in a settlement. A 54-year-old woman who was run over by a garbage
truck had her left leg amputated just above the knee. She received about
E 45,500 in pain and suffering damages. In Germany, a trolley driver received
E 12,500 in respect of the amputation of his forefoot in a case in which he was
50 % comparatively negligent.90 In a case in which a young woman was
involved in a motor accident and had her lower leg amputated, pain and
suffering damages were set at E 40,000.91 In Greece, E 150,000 was awarded to a
27-year-old man after a car accident which resulted in the amputation of his leg
right under the knee.92 In another traffic accident case, a minor received
E 170,000 in pain and suffering damages for having her left leg amputated just
below the knee.93 However, the court only granted about E 58,700 to a 32-
year-old man who was involved in a work-related accident and had his lower
leg amputated.94 In Italy, a man received E 135,000 in pain and suffering
damages for amputation of his foot after an accident.95
Relevant information on the impact of a foot amputation on quality of life can
be found in health economics literature regarding foot ulcers. Increasing
preventive efforts in diabetic patients can lower the probability of foot ulcers
and amputations, and the research investigates whether these benefits are
worth the costs.96 Information is provided on the quality of life experienced by
people without foot ulcers, patients with ongoing foot ulcers, after primary
healing of a foot ulcer, after healing with minor amputation and after healing
with major amputation. A possible problem with using this information is that
would lead to amounts of E 245,000 resp E 127,000. This is still significantly higher than
the amounts granted in most countries.
89 Jansen (fn 51) 43.
90 Jaeger/Luckey (fn 50) 779.
91 Ibid, 776. The plaintiff claimed E 50,000 but because of the poor financial situation and
the lack of insurance of the injurer, who was the victim’s boyfriend, the court only
granted E 40,000.
92 Drama Court of First Instance 124/2004, online in NOMOS: <http://lawdb.intra
softnet.com/index.php>.
93 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 2601/2006, Armenopoulos 2007, 1921.
94 Areios Pagos (Supreme Court) 961/2007, online in NOMOS: <http://lawdb.intra
softnet.com/index.php>.
95 Corte di Cassazione (Highest Court of Appeal) no 25751, 24 October 2008, online in De
Jure: <http://dejure.giuffre.it/psixsite/PaginePubbliche/default.aspx>.
96 See eg G Ragnarson Tellvall/J Apelqvist, Prevention of diabetes-related foot ulcers and
amputations: a cost-utility analysis based on Markov model simulations (2001) 44
Diabetologica 2077.
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it is all related to people with a foot ulcer before amputation. Nonetheless, it
may be instructive to review the information. The difference in QALY value
between people with no ulcer and people who have healed with major
amputation is 0.49.97 In order to better focus on the impact of the amputation
itself, it is in our view better to compare the QALY value of the latter group
with those after primary healing of a foot ulcer, and then the difference is 0.29.
In another research study, it was investigated whether compression stockings
in patients with chronic venous stasis are a cost-effective instrument in
reducing the probability of recurrence of ulcerations. In that research, the
decrease in utility due to amputation of lower extremities is assessed at 0.26.98
Yet another research study has regard to limb-threatening ischemia. The
decrease in utility due to amputation of lower extremities suffered by patients
who were still ambulant after the amputation ranges from 0.3 to 0.35,
depending on if it is compared with the utility of patients who were cured after
revascularization or with patients who were only cured after multiple
revascularization.99 The amputation may involve more than just the foot,
which may explain the higher QALY loss.
If we apply the E 50,000 monetary value of a QALY, it again becomes clear that
the amounts awarded for pain and suffering damages in the cases discussed are
too low from an economic point of view. Using a 0.26 QALY decrease, which
is the lowest from the research we have discussed, an amputation in a 54-year-
old victim would result in an award of about E 211,000. That amount would be
even higher for the younger victims in our examples.
VI. Conclusions
The conclusion from the above analysis is that pain and suffering damages
awarded in legal cases are too low from a health economics perspective. It is
not possible to calculate exactly the correct magnitude of such damages, first
because there is no consensus over the monetary value of the QALY;
secondly, there are different ways to assess the relative weight of different
health impairments, leading to divergent results; thirdly, QALYs are intended
to evaluate different health programmes, treatment methods and techniques in
terms of their cost-effectiveness, not to calculate damages. Notwithstanding
97 Ibid, 2079. Also see G Ragnarson Tellvall/J Apelqvist, Health-related quality of life in
patients with diabetes mellitus and foot ulcers (2000) 14 Journal of Diabetes and Its
Complications (J Diabetes Complications) 238.
98 P Korn et al, Why insurers should reimburse for compression stockings in patients with
chronic venous stasis (2002) 35 Journal of Vascular Surgery (J Vasc Surg) 952.
99 TE Brothers et al, Justification of intervention for limb-threatening ischemia: a surgical
decision analysis (1999) 7 Cardiovascular Surgery (Cardiovasc Sur) 65.
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these caveats, we still think that using the information that can be derived from
QALY studies is a better method to determine pain and suffering damages
than merely looking at the amounts that were awarded in the past. After all,
such awards provide no indication of the correctness of the assessment because
that requires an external framework. By basing our calculations on a very
conservative estimation of the monetary value of a QALY (E 50,000), we feel
that the resulting amounts do not lead to the overestimation of immaterial
losses. This is reinforced by our application of a relatively high discount factor
of 4 %. Further developments in the health economics literature will therefore
in our view more likely lead to upward adjustments of the resulting amounts
than downward adjustments.
In order to be able to achieve the goals discussed in our paper, adjustments in
pain and suffering damages are required. At current levels of awards, the
compensation goal cannot be achieved. After all, if damages should aim at
restoring the balance,100 they should express the gravity of the losses caused by
the injurer. In as far as independent weight is attached to the goal of
satisfaction, pain and suffering damages should also be based on the gravity of
the immaterial losses. The deterrence goal is also served by such an increase,
because currently the injurer does not fully bear the negative consequences of
his activities. Hence, in our view, the magnitude of pain and suffering damages
should be increased.
We see two possible ways in which the use of QALYs could be implemented in
practice, besides the option of mandatory legislation, which we do not
advocate. First, lawyers could base the amount of damages which they claim
for their clients on health economics literature and/or on information
provided by medical experts. Courts would then have to decide whether to
grant these higher claims. If they do, these higher amounts will find their way
into the currently applied tables with court decisions, so that the QALY
approach would, bottom-up, gain ground. The second approach would be to
replace the tables with court decisions by the amounts based on QALY
research. Given that health economics research often results in an average
QALY weight accompanied by an upper and a lower limit, the envisaged
QALY-tables would offer a range of amounts rather than a fixed amount. The
courts could then use these tables in assessing pain and suffering damages. Our
paper provides information on four health conditions, but it should be clear
that more health conditions should be evaluated before such tables could be
applied. However, it may not be necessary to include all conditions
imaginable. For example, if the table included amputation of a foot and
amputation of a leg, even if there were no amount included for amputation of a
lower leg, it may be assumed that this should lie in between the two others.
100 Which, according to Lindenbergh (fn 6) 34, is the purpose of compensation.
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If pain and suffering damages were indeed to be increased, insurance premiums
would rise because coverage would have to be extended. The increase in
insurance premiums in our view will not lead to uninsurability. That problem
is not primarily caused by the size of the insured liability, but rather by the
uncertainty of the expected risk.101 Health economics insights may lead to an
enhanced ability to predict the level of pain and suffering damages, which
would lead to better assessment of the expected risks than under the current
approach.
Much additional research is needed to provide more clarity regarding the way
in which information from cost-effectiveness research of health care can be
utilised in tort law, in particular the assessment of QALY weights, the possible
problem that some QALY research addresses improvements in health due to
medical treatment whereas tort law is concerned with decreases in health due
to accidents,102 and insights from research regarding adaptation.103 Refining the
answers to these questions enables a better assessment of pain and suffering
damages. We hope that our paper has already made clear that enough reasons
exist to regard current awards as too low and hence to increase the level of pain
and suffering damages in the future.
101 M Faure, The View from Law and Economics, in: G Wagner (ed), Tort Law and
Liability Insurance (2005) 251, 252.
102 This may be relevant due to the issue of loss aversion, which implies that risk averse
people weigh a loss of a certain size more heavily than a gain of the same size. If this
were taken into account, the QALY values used may still be an underestimation of the
losses in question. Note however that much QALY research focuses on the decrease in
health due to a certain condition, and investigates whether treatments to avoid the
decrease are worth their costs.
103 This research suggests that people have a great capacity to adapt to their situation. This
could imply that the utility loss due to deterioration in health decreases over time,
because people adapt to (eg) their disability. This issue could be incorporated by (eg)
choosing a higher discount factor, or by only using QALY values which are based on
patient reports rather than on reports by medical experts or volunteers. After all,
patients may provide assessments in which the element of adaptation is already in-
corporated.
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